A Secure and Efficient Protocol for Group Key agreement in Heterogeneous
  Environment by Saha, Mounita & Chowdhury, Dipanwita Roy
ar
X
iv
:0
90
8.
25
09
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
8 A
ug
 20
09
A SECURE AND EFFICIENT PROTOCOL FOR GROUP KEY
AGREEMENT IN HETEROGENEOUS ENVIRONMENT
Mounita Saha, Dipanwita Roy Chowdhury
Department of compurer science and engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharappur, India
mounita@gmail.com, drc@cse.iitkgp.ernet.in
Abstract
Secure group communication in heterogeneous environment is gaining popularity due to the advent of wire-
less and ubiquitous computing. Although a number of protocols for group key agreement have been proposed,
most of them are not applicable in heterogeneous environment where a number of computationally limited nodes
coexist with one or more computationally efficient nodes. Among the few existing protocols, where some fail
to satisfy the key agreement properties, some are unable to handle the agreement for dynamic group. In this
work, we propose a constant round group key agreement protocol for heterogeneous environment using polyno-
mial interpolation. The protocol ensures both communication and computation efficiency by shifting the major
computation load on powerful users, achieves true contributory key agreement property and dynamic handling of
user join and leave. The security of the protocol has been analyzed under formal model. The comparison result
shows considerable improvement in protocol efficiency compared to the existing ones.
Keywords: Group key agreement, Heterogeneous environment, Hierarchical key agreement, Provable security
1 INTRODUCTION
The key establishment problem has been widely studied in the literature. However, due to the changing scenario
of communication applications, it still continues to be an active area of research. The addition of certain pro-
tocol properties desired in certain situations and some extra assumptions about the network setup and security
infrastructure have opened up new challenges for the key establishment problem. Key establishment is generally
classified into two classes: key transport, where one of the users chooses the key and key agreement, where all the
users contribute to the computation of the key.
In recent times, as different group oriented applications proliferate in modern computing environment, the
design of an efficient key agreement protocol for group has received much attention in the literature. One focus
area in group key establishment is designing protocols for heterogeneous environment where user nodes with
different computation capabilities coexist. Typically in a heterogeneous environment, a number of user nodes
have limited computation capability, whereas one or more users have more computation capability. The example
of such environment is mobile networks and ubiquitous computing environment.
On the contrary to a common initial impression, secure group communication is not a simple extension of
secure two-party communication. Beyond the fulfillment of security requirements, a large number of the existing
group key agreement protocols suffer from lack of efficiency. Protocol efficiency and scalability in group key
establishment is of great concern due to the direct relation of the number of participants to computation and
communication complexity. It can be noted that, one desirable property of GKA in heterogeneous environment is
to ensure computation and communication efficiency for the low power users.
In this work, we present a truly contributory group key agreement protocol for heterogeneous environment
where a number of resource constrained users are connected to one/more powerful users. Unlike the previous
protocols which are based on Diffie-Hellman scheme, our protocol design uses non-Diffie Hellman technique and
achieves better computation and communication efficiency. We also present a proof of security of the protocol in
random oracle model.
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1.1 Related work
The original idea of extending the 2-party key establishment to the multi-party setting dates back to the classical
paper of Ingermarsson et al. [9], and is followed by many works [14, 7, 2]. However, all these approaches simply
assume a passive adversary, or only provide an informal/non-standard security analysis for an active adversary.
Also, in the earlier protocols, the round complexity is linear in the number of group members.
The first constant round protocol secure against passive adversary was given in [4]. More recently, based on
this, Katz and Yung [12] have proposed the first constant-round protocol for authenticated group key agreement
that has been proven secure against an active adversary. The protocol requires three rounds of communication
and achieves provable security under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model. While
the protocol is very efficient in general, this full symmetry negatively impacts the protocol performance in a
heterogeneous scenario.
In [1] Boyd and Nieto have introduced a one-round group key agreement protocol which is provably secure
in the random oracle model. This protocol is computationally asymmetric. In recent times Bresson et al. have
proposed a number of group key agreement protocols [6, 3, 5] and have given the first provable security model
for security analysis of group key agreement protocol. Bresson and Catalano [3] have presented a provably-
secure protocol which completes in two rounds of communication. Interestingly, unlike previous approaches,
they construct the protocol by combining the properties of the ElGamal encryption scheme with standard secret
sharing techniques. However, this protocol suffers from a significant communication overhead both in terms of the
number of messages sent and the number of bits communicated throughout the protocol. In [5] another constant
round protocol was proposed which is suitable for low power mobile devices. Nam et.al has shown an attack on it
[10]. Then in [11], Nam et al. proposed a group key agreement protocol for an imbalanced network that provides
forward secrecy. In their protocol, the computation time for a mobile node is two modular exponential operations.
They adopted the Katz and Yung scalable compiler to transform their two-round protocol into an authenticated
group key agreement protocol with three rounds. However, Tseng [13] later showed that the protocol is not a
real group key agreement protocol as the users cannot confirm that their contribution was involved in establishing
the group key. [13] also proposed a group key agreement for resource constrained environment which is secure
against passive adversary.
1.2 Our contribution
The main contribution of this work is to design a contributory group key agreement protocol in heterogeneous
communication environment. Unlike the previous protocols, the proposed protocol at the same time achieves
mutual authentication, completes in 2 round and provides very low computation and communication overhead for
the low-power users. The design goals of a protocol for authentication and key agreement depends on a number
of assumptions like the user node capabilities, the communication model setup, i.e. how the users are connected
to each other.
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Figure 1: System model
The system model that we consider for this work is shown in figure 1. It consists of a cluster of n mobile hosts
or users with limited computational power U = {U1,U2, . . . ,Un}, and a computationally efficient node U0. The
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participants communicate with the U0 to establish a common conference key among themselves. The users do not
communicate among themselves. All the communications are through U0.
The contributions of the work can be summarized as follows:
1. Asymmetric computation: In a heterogeneous environment, the computational requirement by the low power
nodes can become one major bottleneck if the amount of computation increases with number of users. In
our work, we follow an asymmetric computation pattern and fix the amount of computation required by the
host nodes to a constant value. The major computation burden that increases with the number of users are
shifted to one/more computationally powerful node.
2. Verifiability of contribution: In the literature, some protocols [5, 11] have been proposed for server based
contributory key agreement both for general and hierarchical layout. However, as pointed out in [13], none
of them assure the user about its participation in key construction and thus user is not able to distinguish
between a random key or an actual key. We note that, the contributory key agreement is meaningful only
when the users verify that their contributions are indeed utilized in key construction. In the proposed work,
users are able to verify the utilization of their contributions.
3. Efficiency in computation: We reduce the number of expensive operations required to be performed by each
user. Specifically we remove the computationally expensive exponentiation operations and limit the online
operations of the users to a single linear function. All other operations are performed offline.
4. Dynamic join and leave : We consider the users to be completely dynamic i.e. allow the users to leave or
join the group within a protocol session.
5. Formal security analysis: Compared to the number of cryptographic protocols proposed in the literature,
security of very few of them have been proved under a formal model. In this work, apart from informal
analysis of protocol goals, we provide the security guarantee of the protocols under provable security model.
2 User-verifiable contributory key agreement
In this section, we present the proposed group key agreement protocol.
The following notations are used for the protocol descriptions.
U : The set of users Ui, i ∈ (1,n)
U0 : The leader having higher resources
IDi : The unique identity of user Ui ∈U
Gp : Cyclic group of order p
g : Generator of group Gp
H : A collision free hash function
τ : A secure signature scheme
pri, pui : Signature key pair for user Ui
Ci : A counter shared between user Ui and U0
The public parameters Gp and g, defined here, are assumed to be known to all the participants in advance.
The hash function H and the signature scheme τ is also known to all. Each group member in protocol is having
an unique identity IDi. The protocol is defined in an asymmetric setting consisting of a powerful node U0 and
a set of group users (U1,U2, . . . ,Un). The U0 has a (private,public) key pair (pr0, pu0) for encryption-decryption
and signature. Each user Ui also has a set of signing and verifying key pair (pri, pui) for signature generation and
verification. Each user Ui, i ∈ [1,n], shares a counter Ci with U0. The Ci is included for freshness and incremented
at each communication session.
2.1 Proposed protocol
• Step 1: Preparing user contribution and signature
Each user Ui with identity IDi chooses its contribution (xi) randomly. Let Ci be the current value of counter
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for user Ui. The values of (IDi||ID0||xi||Ci) are then encrypted with U0’s public key. Here || denotes the
concatenation operation.
ei = {IDi||ID0||xi||Ci}pu0
Ui also takes a signature sigi of (IDi||ID0||xi||Ci) using it’s private signature key.
sigi = τpri(IDi||ID0||xi||Ci)
Each user then sends ei,sigi to the U0.
Ui →U0 : ei,sigi
All these operations can be performed offline. The advantage of using counter over timestamp is that the
operations involving the counter can be performed offline.
• Step 2: Receipt of user message and verification at U0
The U0 receives all the messages and decrypts them. It then verifies all the signatures of the corresponding
users. It also checks the validity of the counter Ci and accepts if the signatures are valid.
• Step 3: Computation of secret by U0
The pair of identity and random value (IDi,xi) received from each user is taken as it’s contribution to
construct the key. U0 also selects a random number x0 ∈ Gp as its contribution. The secret is constructed by
interpolating all the contributions into a polynomial. The n+ 1 values of (IDi,xi) are taken as (n+ 1) input
points to the interpolation algorithm. As, all the identities of the users are distinct, a distinct polynomial
will be obtained from the fresh input. Let the coefficients of the resulting polynomial be a0,a1, . . . ,an. Thus
the polynomial is as follows:
A(x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x2 + . . .+ anxn
The secret value is constructed as K = (a0||a1|| . . . ||an).
• Step 4:Computation of reply message from U0
For each user Ui, U0 computes a one way hash H (IDi, ID0,xi,Ci) over the identity IDi, ID0, counter Ci
and contribution xi. Then the secret value K is bitwise XORed with this hash value to obtain a value Pi as
follows:
Pi = K⊕H (IDi||ID0||Ci||xi)
If length of K is more than the hash output, it can be sent in multiple fragments.
Let Y = {Pi|i = 1...n}, U0 takes a signature sig0 of the values (ID0,Y,U) using its private signature key.
sig0 = τpr0(ID0,Y,U)
The U0 finally creates a broadcast message M = {Y,U,sig0} and broadcasts M to all the users.
• Step 5:Secret key computation & Verification at users end
Each user Ui will receive the U0’s messages and verify the signature of U0. Then the user obtains the value
of H (IDi, ID0,xi,Ci). This value can be calculated by the user offline. The shared secret will be calculated
by the user as follows:
Pi⊕H (IDi, ID0,xi,Ci)
= K⊕H (IDi, ID0,xi,Ci)⊕H (IDi, ID0,xi,Ci)
= K
If K is sent fragmented, the user has to obtain all the fragments in a similar manner and combine them to
get the secret.
The users can now verify whether the secret is constructed using their contributions. If the contribution xi of
user Ui is used, then the relation A(IDi) = xi should be true. The verification is done in the following way:
After receiving the coefficients user Ui will compute the following
a0 + a1IDi + a2ID2i + . . .+ anIDni
If this value is equal to xi, the user knows his/her contribution was used in key construction. According to
Horner’s rule, this computation can be written as
a0 + a1IDi + a2ID2i + . . .+ anIDni
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Figure 2: Proposed Conference Key Agreement Protocol
=a0 + IDi(a1 + IDi(a2 + IDi(. . . )))
This way, the verification requires only n multiplications.
Finally, the shared secret key for conference is computed by all the users as Key = F (K,U), where F is a
predefined one-way function.
Figure 2 demonstrates one instance of the Key Agreement scheme of proposed protocol.
2.2 Dynamic handling of user join and leave
When a conference session is in progress, users may be allowed to join or leave. In some applications it may not
be desirable that a new joining user understands the content of previous conversations. Similarly, it is also not
desirable that a leaving user continues to understand the ongoing conversation. Thus, ensuring the security of the
conference while allowing dynamic join and leave is essential. In the proposed protocol, the security of the secret
key while maintaining dynamic join/leave is maintained in the following way.
User Join
When a new user Unew joins, it the sends its share (IDnew,xnew) to U0. The set of users is updated as U =U∪IDnew.
U0 also refreshes its contribution to (ID0,x′0) using a new random value x′0 ∈ Gp. Then the shared secret is
computed and distributed as described in steps 3 to 5 in key agreement.
User Leave
When an existing user Uold leaves, U0 discards its share (IDold ,xold). The set of users is updated as U =U∩IDold .
U0 also refreshes its contribution to (ID0,x′0) using a new value x′0. Then the shared secret is computed and
distributed as described in steps 3 to 5 in key agreement.
It can be noted that, as one group member joins or leaves, it’s corresponding contribution point is added/discarded.
The U0’s contribution also changes. So, whenever there is a change in membership, atleast two points of the secure
polynomial change and its value is refreshed. Now, from the property of polynomial interpolation, it is known
that, if 1 out of (n+ 1) points on a n degree polynomial is changed, the polynomial changes in an unpredictable
way. This is information theoretically true. Thus, secrecy of the previous (new) key from new (former) group
members is maintained.
2.3 Security Analysis
The proposed protocol has the security properties of key freshness, key confidentiality and mutual authentication.
Also true contributiveness of the key is achieved as no participant can predetermine the key or influence the key.
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An informal analysis shows that it is resistant to common attacks such as replay, impersonation, unknown key
share and collusion.
The prime motivation of the proposed protocol is to reduce the computational overhead from the users. Thus,
we have deliberately not considered the perfect forward secrecy. However this property can be easily achieved by
associating a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
The advantage of taking identities IDi as x coordinate values of polynomial interpolation is that they are
unique. However, if the identities of users are known to each other, an user may be able to obtain the contributions
of other users. Although this knowledge does not help a new/former user to deduce the old/new key, it may not be
desirable in some applications. In that case, instead of using IDi directly as the x coordinate value, the H(IDi,xi)
value can be used. As the one way hash is assumed to be collision free, this method will still produce unique
values for x coordinates. Alternatively, the counter values Ci known between user and U0 can also be used for x
coordinates.
We now present the security analysis of the protocol in formal model.
The security model
The first formal model for security analysis of group key agreement protocols was given by Bressonet al [5]. We
also use a similar game based security model widely used in literature.
The protocol participants are a set U = (U0,U1, . . . ,Un) of all users that can participate in the key agreement
protocol. Each user can simultaneously participate in different protocols sessions. Thus an instance of user Ui in
protocol session s is represented by the oracle Πsi . Each user Ui ∈ U obtains a private-public key pair (pri, pui)
for signature generation/verification.
The partner ID of an user Ui in session s is the set of all users who compute the same key as the user Ui in that
session. The partner ID is defined using session ID. The session ID is defined in terms of the messages exchanged
among the users in a session. The detail definition of session identity is given in the [5].
The adversary
The adversary A is active and assumed to have control over all communication flows in the network. The adversary
communicates with the users through a number of queries, each of which represent a capability of the adversary.
The queries are as follows.
• Send(Ui,s,m): Models the ability of A to send message m to user Ui. The adversary gets back from his
query, the response that the user Ui would have generated on processing the message m. If the message
m is not in expected format, the oracle would halt. If the oracle accepts, rejects or simply halts, the reply
will indicate that. If the message m = NULL, a new session would be initiated. An oracle is said to have
accepted, if it has obtained/computed a session key and accepted it.
• Reveal(Ui): If an oracle Πsi accepts and holds a session key K , then the adversary A can use the reveal
query to obtain the session key held by the oracle.
• Corrupt(Ui): When the adversary sends a corrupt query to an user Ui, the internal state information, that the
user holds is revealed. Also, the long term secret key of user Ui is replaced by a value K of the adversary’s
choice.
• Test(Ui): Once an oracle Πsi has accepted a session key Ki j, the adversary can ask a single Test query. In
reply to this query, a random bit b is chosen. If b = 0 the session key is returned, otherwise a random string
is returned from the same distribution as the session keys. The advantage of the adversary to distinguish the
session key from the random key is taken as the basis of determining security of the protocol.
Security definitions
Now we define the security assumptions for the proposed key agreement protocol within the security model given
above. The detailed definitions can be found in [5, 11, 1].
• Freshness
Freshness captures the intuitive fact that a session key is not obviously known to the adversary. A session
key is fresh if it has been accepted by an uncorrupted oracle and the oracle or any of its partners are not
subjected to the reveal or corrupt query.
• Authenticated group key agreement
The security of an authenticated group key agreement protocol P is defined by a game G(A ,P ) between the
computationally bound adversary A and protocol P . The adversary A executes the protocol P and executes
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Figure 3: Comparison of communication
Table 1: Comparison with existing protocols
Protocol User U0 round Message Dyn Auth Verif PS
[11] 2Ex,1sig,1Sv (n+ 1)Ex,1Sig, n Sv 2 n− 1(u),1(b) Y Y N Y
[1] 1D, 1Sv (n− 1)E,1Sig 1 n(b) N N N Y
[5] 2Ex, (n− 1)Ex 2 n− 1(u),1(b) Y N N Y
[8] 1Ex,1E 1Ex,nD 4 2+ 3(n− 1) Y Y N N
[15] 1Ex,1E 1Ex,nD 4 2+ 3(n− 1) Y Y N N
Proposed 1S,1Sv (n− 1)D,1Sig, n Sv 2 n− 1(u),1(b) Y Y Y Y
Ex:exponentiation Sig: Signature Sv: Signature verification E: encryption D: decryption u:unicast b:broadcast
all the queries described in the security model, as many times as she wishes. A wins the game, if at any
time it asks a single Test query to a fresh user and gets back a l-bit string as the response to the query. At a
later point of time it outputs a bit b′ as a guess for the hidden bit b. Let GG (Good Guess) be the event that
b = b′, i.e. the adversary A , correctly guesses the bit b. Then we define the advantage of A in attacking P ,
as
AdvPA(k) = 2.Pr[GG]− 1
We say that a group key agreement scheme P is secure if AdvPA(k) is negligible for any probabilistic poly-
nomial time adversary A .
• Secure Signature Scheme
The security notion for a signature scheme is that it is computationally infeasible for an adversary to produce
a valid forgery σ with respect to any message m under (adaptive) chosen message attack (CMA). A signature
scheme τ(G ,S ,V ) is (t,q,ε) secure if there is no adversary whose probability in mounting an existential
forgery under CMA within time t after making q queries is greater than ε(negligible). The probability is
denoted as Succτ(A).
• Secure encryption scheme
A public-key encryption scheme PE = (K;E;D) consists of three algorithms: A key generation algorithm
K giving a pair (e;d) of matching public and private keys, an encryption algorithm E , and a decryption
algorithm D.
The encryption scheme PE is secure if the adversary’s advantage is negligible. We denote the probability
as Succenc(A).
Thus, we have defined the security model for the protocol definition. In the next section, we proceed to
describe the detail of the proposed protocol.
Proof
We now analyze the security of the protocol as the probability that an adversary can some information on the key
and gain some advantage against the authenticated key agreement (AKE) security. Let denote the probability as
AdvakeP . Let A be the adversary against the AKE security of the protocol making at most qs send quires and qh
hash queries (to hash oracles H and F). Let A plays the game G0 against the protocol.
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We now incrementally define a series of games such that each subsequent game has some additional properties.
Let b is the bit involved in the Test query and b′ be the guess output by the adversary. Then, Wini denote the event
in game Gi when b = b′. In each game, we simulate the protocol and consider the adversary to attack the protocol.
Finally we relate all of them to obtain the probability of Win0.
Let all the queries are answered by a simulator X . It maintains two tables. In the table S, it maintains the
transcript of all sessions initiated by it. Also, a list LH is maintained to answer the queries to the hash oracles. n is
the number of users.
Game G0: This is the real attack. The X generates a pair of signing/verification key and the U0 is given a pair of
public-private key. It answers all queries of the adversary in accordance of the protocol.
Game G1: Let Forge be an event that A asks for a send query to the U0 such that the verification of the signature
is correct and m′ was not previously output by a client as an answer to another send query. It means that A is
sending a message that it has produced itself. Such an event can be detected by X as it maintains a table of all
protocol transcripts generated by itself. In this case, X aborts the game and outputs b′ randomly.
The event Forge occurs when A was successful to make an existential forgery against the signature scheme
for one of the participants. The probability of this event is thus n ∗ Succτ(A), where Succτ(A) is the success
probability of signature forgery against the signature scheme τ, given some public key PK.
The game is identical to G0 except when Forge occurs. Thus,
Pr(Win1)−Pr(Win0)≤ n ∗ Succτ(A)
Game G2: Let Enc be the event when the adversary makes a hash oracle query involving some (IDi,xi) and the
same hash query was asked by the a protocol participant (user or U0). This can be checked from the list of hash
that is maintained. If such an event occurs it means, adversary has been able to attack the encryption scheme.
The probability of success against the encryption scheme after making qs queries is qs ∗Succenc(A). The game
is identical to G1 except when enc occurs. Thus the total winning probability of the game
Pr(Win2)−Pr(Win1)≤ qs ∗ Succenc(A)
Combining all the results, we obtain
Pr(Win0)≤ N ∗ Succτ(A)+ qs ∗ Succenc(A)
Thus, according to our security assumptions, the probability of the polynomially bound adversary to win the
game is negligible.
2.4 Performance analysis
In this subsection we present a performance comparison of the proposed protocol with the existing ones.
The performance of an authenticated group key agreement protocol is examined based on both its computation
and communication requirements. The computation requirement is assessed by the number of major operations
performed. The communication requirement is measured by counting the number of rounds, messages and bits to
be communicated.
Communication requirement In figure 3, we perform a comparison of the communication requirement of the
proposed protocol with [11]. The comparison is based on the number of bits required to be transmitted by powerful
user U0 versus the number of users. The signatures and hash values are assumed to be 256 bit whereas the cyclic
group of public key system is taken 1024 bit. It can be noted that the proposed protocol requires much lesser
number of bits to be transmitted from the powerful node to the users and the difference grows with increasing
number of users. The difference in the proposed protocol is achieved by using non-Diffie-Hellman based key
computation technique.
Computation requirement
Table 1 shows a comparison of the proposed work with respect to existing similar works. Here first two
columns show the computation requirements of user and U0 respectively. Next two columns show the number of
rounds and messages required to complete the protocol transactions. The next column (dynamic) denotes whether
the protocol is dynamic or not, Auth denotes whether authentication is provided and Verif denotes user verifiability
and PS denotes provably secure.
The table shows that the proposed protocol, in-spite of offering the verifiability and mutual authentication
property, is comparable to the existing works. Apart from [1], the rest of the protocols also use 2 exponentiations.
The [1], despite being computation efficient uses n broadcasts which is expensive. In the proposed protocol, most
of the computations performed by the users, i.e. encryption, hash computation and signature can be computed
offline. Thus only a bit-wise xor is the main operation to be performed online. Moreover, the offline computations
are also less expensive as the user performs a hash computation and one public key encryption which is not
expensive as a public key (3− 16 bit) is short.
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3 Conclusion
In this work we have provided an efficient and scalable solution for true-contributory group key agreement in
an heterogeneous environment, which consists of both nodes with limited and relatively higher computational
resources. The protocol transfers most of the computation and communication load to the powerful node, whereas
the only online computation performed by a low power user is a single XOR computation.
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